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Abstract
In some Business-Cycle models a scal policy that sets income taxes counter cycli-
cally can cause macroeconomic instability by giving rise to multiple equilibria and
as a result to uctuations caused by self fullling expectations. This paper shows
that consolidated budget rules with endogenous income-tax rates can be stabilizing
if they exhibit monetary dominance, where monetary policy manages expectations
by implementing an active interest rate rule. This result is robust for plausible de-
grees of externalities in production. The size of the government, however, plays a
key role in the degree of activeness that the monetary authority should exhibit in
order to stabilize the economy. If government spending are not too large relative to
private consumption, a neutral monetary policy [such that the real rate of interest
is constant in and o¤ the steady state] is also stabilizing
Key words: Fiscal Policy; Capital-Income Tax; Monetary Policy; Macroeconomic
Stabilization; Finance Constraint; Arbitrage Channel; Investment-Based Channel;
Consumption-Based Channel;
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Introduction
The problem of macroeconomic stability where governments implement bal-
anced budget rules has drawn much attention in the past several years. One
important issue concerning this literature is that conclusions can be very dif-
ferent, even opposite, if government spending is set so as to balance income
taxes generated by xed rates, or if income taxes are set so as to balance a
budget with xed wasteful government spending. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(1997) explore the interrelations between local stability of equilibria and a
balanced budget rule whereby constant government expenditures are nanced
by proportional taxation on labor and capital income. They use a one-sector
innite-horizon representative agent model with perfectly competitive markets
and a constant returns to scale technology. It turns out that for empirically
plausible values of labor and capital income tax rates, the economy can ex-
hibit an indeterminate steady state and a continuum of stationary sunspot
equilibria. Under this type of balanced budget constraint, when agents be-
come optimistic about the future of the economy and decide to work harder
and invest more, the government is forced to lower the tax rate as total output
rises. The countercyclical tax policy will help fulll agentsinitial optimistic
expectations, thus leading to indeterminacy of equilibria and endogenous busi-
ness cycle uctuations. Guo and Harrison (2008) extend Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribes (1997) analysis by the inclusion of useful government spending. They
show that Schmitt-Grohe and Uribes (1997) indeterminacy results are robust
to incorporating useful government purchases of goods and services, regardless
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of how they are introduced to the model. Under a balanced-budget specica-
tion, xed government spending act simply as a scaling constant in either rms
production or householdsutility function. It follows that none of the models
stability analysis is a¤ected by allowing for productive or utility-generating
government expenditure. This robustness nding highlights the importance of
an alternative scal policy specication under an exogenous public-spending
regime.
The present paper contributes to the literature by introducing a consolidated
budget setup where a scal authority taxes income and a monetary authority
nance the primary decit via seniorage. We follow Leeper (1991) and assume
that the size of seniorage and its composition (bonds and money) are set by
the monetary authority alone before the size of primary decit is revealed.
Only then the scal authority sets the rate of income tax so as to balance the
consolidated budget. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) provide evidence using
a numerical model calibrated to the U.S. economy that this type of policy
prescription is stabilizing. Here a formal proof is provided.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 illustrates a model
where a consolidated government runs a balanced budget. The composition
of the budget and the restriction imposed on the two authorities (scal and
monetary) are thoroughly described. The optimal program of a representa-
tive household is then scrutinized and local stability analysis of equilibrium is
performed. it turns out that a policy such that imposes via nancial markets
an increase in the expected real rate of interest during booms is su¢ cient to
overcome the indeterminacies reported in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribes (1997)
and in Guo and Harrison (2008). Results slightly change where government
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spending are not too large in the sense of the ratio between government ex-
penditure and private consumption relative to a multiple of the elasticity of
production with respect to capital and the intertemporal elasticity of con-
sumption substitution. In that case a policy that induces a constant expected
real rate of interest in and o¤ steady state is also stabilizing. Section 3 extends
the analysis to economies that exhibit production externalities associated with
per capita capital. Results in section 3 show that the prescribed policy rule is
robust to production externalities. Section 4 concludes.
1 Consolidated Balanced Budget with Income Tax and Finance
Constraints
In the present context we assume that the government is comprised of a scal
authority and a monetary authority, and that the government runs a consoli-
dated balanced budget. Hence, assuming a monetary authority we implicitly
assume the existence of money. Accordingly, money enters the economy via a
cash-in-advance constraint on all transactions. To avoid steady state multiplic-
ity, the analysis is restricted, following Benhabib et. al (2002), to steady states
where the nominal rate of interest is strictly positive. Finally, it is assumed
throughout that the economy is perfectly competitive.
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1.1 The Economic Environment
1.1.1 The Government
The balanced budget rule under scrutiby is in the spirit of Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2007) who derive their determinacy results numerically. It is as-
sumed that the consolidated government prints money, Mt; issues nominal
risk free bond, Bt; collects taxes in the amount of Tt and faces an exogenous
xed stream of expenditure g. Its instantaneous dollar denominated budget
constraint is given by
RtBt + Ptg =

Mt +

Bt + PtTt
where Pt is the level of nominal prices. It is assumed throughout that the
scal regime is passive in the terminology of Leeper (1991). The central bank
implements an interest rate feedback rule. It imposes a desired interest rate,
Rt; by controlling the price of riskless nominal bonds and exchanging money
for bonds at any quantities demanded at that price. In that sense, the nominal
rate of interest is exogenous and Mt; Bt are endogenous.
The scal authority is then constrained to set Tt so as to balance the budget. It
is assumed throughout the paper that Tt =  tkt [rt   qt] where  t denotes an
income tax rate and it can vary with time, rtkt is total income in the economy,
where kt; rt denote the stock of capital and the rent on capital, respectively.
The term qtkt represents a depratiation tax allowance where  is a constant
rate of capital depreciation and qt denotes the market price of one unit of
installed capital 1 . Accordingly, the nominal consolidated budget constraint is
1 In general, total tax revenues consist of lump sum taxation, revenues from labor
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given by RtBt + Ptg =

Mt +

Bt + Pt tkt [rt   qt] :
let mt  MtPt and bt  BtPt denote real money holdings and real bonds holdings,
respectively. Also let at  bt +mt denote a measure of nancial wealth, which
consists of government liabilities, denominated in real goods. Dividing both
sides of the nominal instanteneous budget constraint by Pt and rearranging,
yield that the real nancial wealth evolves according to:

at = (Rt   t) at  Rtmt + [g    tkt (rt   qt)]
Where t 

Pt
Pt
is the rate of change of nominal prices i.e. the rate of ination.
In this economy, printing money to nance the primary decit gives rise to
ination. As ination erodes real liabilities it can be viewed as a source of
revenue. Ination therefore plays a role similar to that of a lump sum tax.
The type of scal policy considered in this paper is such that given an exoge-
nous stream of (real) expenditure g and the nature of monetary policy, to be
specied in following sections, the scal authority sets the income tax rate,  t;
so as to balance the instantaneous budget of the consolidated government.
It is assumed that monetary policy takes the form of an interest-rate feedback
rule whereby the nominal interest rate is set as an increasing function of
instantaneous ination. Specically, it is assumed that
Rt = R (t) where t can be interpreted as expected-ination. R() is
income taxation, revenues from capital income taxation, and revenues from rms
prots taxation. However, in our model, under perfect competition rmsprots are
zero. Also, in this model, we can ignore lump sum taxation without loss of generality
as we know that it is not a source of indeterminacies.
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continuous, non-decreasing and strictly positive, and there exists at least one
steady-state, , such that R () =  +  where  denotes the rate of time
preference of a representative household and  is a desired ination target. It
is further assumed that the monetary authority reacts to an increase (decrease)
in the rate of ination by increasing (decreasing) the nominal rate of interest.
Dupor (2001) and Benhabib et al. (2001) discuss the issue of monetary-scal
regimes and determination of equilibrium in a continuous time model where
the monetary authority sets a nominal interest rate as a function of the instan-
taneous rate of ination. The policy considered here follows this line and is
also in one line with the forward-looking policy considered by Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2005) in their discrete-time model. As we know, the instantaneous rate
of ination in a continuous-time setting is the right-derivative of the logged
price level and thus, the discrete-time counterpart of a countinuous-time pol-
icy rule that sets the interest rate in response to the instanteneous rate of
ination is characterized by forward-looking policy that responds to expected
future ination.
1.1.2 Households
The model is a continuous time, exible price version of Benhabib et. al.
(2001). The economy is populated by a continuum of identical innitely long-
lived households, with measure one. It is assumed that consumption and
money balances are Edgeworth complements. In Benhabib et. al. (2001) money
enters the utility function, and Edgeworth complementarity between consump-
tion and money balances is achieved by assuming a positive cross derivative
of money and consumption. Here, in order to keep the analysis simple, we
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impose a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption and so money enters the
liquidity constraint 2 . The representative households lifetime utility function
is given by
U =
1Z
0
e tu(ct)dt
where  > 0 denotes the rate of time preference, ct denotes consumption, u() is
twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. The households
budget constraint is:
ct + It +

bt +

mt = (Rt   t)bt   tmt + (1   t)rtkt +  tktqt
where It is the ow of investment. Finally it is assumed that the production
function,f(k) , is twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
By considering at as the real value of non-capital wealth, the households
budget constraint becomes:

at = (Rt   t)at  Rtmt + (1   t)f(kt)  ct   It +  tktqt
2 Feenstra (1986) demonstrates that a using real money as an argument of the util-
ity function is functionally equivalent to entering money into a liquidity constraint.
Specically, he argues that cash-in-advance constraints can be viewed as a special
case of a utility function that includes real balances with the crucial feature of a zero
elasticity of substitution between goods and money. Feenstra (1986) argues that the
zero elasticity of substitution of the cash-in-advance specication means that it is
approximated by utility functions with a positive cross derivative between goods
and money regardless of how concave u(c,m) may be. In what follows, the optimal
program, specied by equations (2)-(5), demonstrate that the liquidity constraint is
observably equivalent to Benhabib et. al.s (2002) MIU specication where money
and consumption are Edgeworth complements.
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Competitive equilibrium in the goods market at the closed economy implies
ct + It + g = f(kt) = rtkt , it is thus straightforward to show that the evolu-
tion of goverment liabilities due to the scal-monetary rule coinside with the
evolution of the householdsnancial wealth.
Money enters the economy via a liquidity constraint on all transactions:
t+ Z
t
[c(s) + I(s)] ds 
mt that can be linearly approximated as 3 :
 (ct + It)  mt
Finally, and without loss of generality,   is normalized to 1 and the households
lifetime maximization problem becomes
Max
1Z
0
e tu(ct)dt
s:t:

at = (Rt   t)at  Rtmt + (1   t)f(kt)  ct   It +  tktqt (1)

kt = It   kt
ct + It  mt
With the following no-Ponzi-game condition Limt!1e
 
tZ
0
[R(s) (s)]ds
[at + kt] =
0 . The households problem suggests that capital accumulation entails an op-
portunity cost due to a nance constraint. This specication is similar to
Woodford (1984). In general, macroeconomic continuous time modeling could
3 This version of cash-in-advance is similar to Rebelo and Xie (1999) and Feenstra
(1985). a Taylor series expansion gives
t+ Z
t
[c(s)+I(s)]ds =  [c(s)+I(s)]+ 12 
2[

c(t)+

I(t)] +    and so  (c+ I)  m can be interpreted as a rst-order approximation.
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be misleading in the sense that it does not correctly approximate the behavior
of the discrete time model of arbitrarily small periods. Therefore, special care
should be taken with assumptions of the model that are not realistic for small
period length. Carlstrom and Fuesrt (2005) point out that modeling policy
issues in continuous time could end up with conclusions that are opposite to
the conclusions drawn from a discrete-time counterpart of the model. They at-
tribute the opposite conclusions to the di¤erence in timing in the no-arbitrage
condition of investing in bonds and capital between the two settings: while the
continuous-time setting entails a contemporaneous no-arbitrage condition, a
similar no-arbitrage condition in the discrete-time setting involves only future
variables which bring a zero eigenvalue into the linearized dynamic system.
Gliksberg (2009) shows that introducing nance constraints as in Woodford
(1984) is one way to overcome implausible contemporaneous features of no-
arbitrage in continuous time macroeconomic models that enter at the "back
door" as the period length gets shorter.
1.1.3 The optimal program
Households choose sequences of fct; It;mtg so as to maximize lifetime utility,
taking as given the initial stock of capital k0, and the time path f t; Rt; tg1t=0
which is exogeneous from the view point of a household. The necessary con-
ditions for an interior maximum of the households problem are
u0(ct) = t + t (2)
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qt
t
= 1 +Rt (3)
t = Rtt (4)
t(mt   ct   It) = 0; t  0 (5)
Where t and qt are time-dependent co-state variables interpreted as the mar-
ginal valuation of nancial assets and installed capital, respectively. t is a
time-dependent Lagrange multiplier associated with the liquidity constraint
and equation (5) is the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker condition. Second, the
co-state variables must evolve according to the law

t = t [+ t  Rt] (6)

qt =  t [(1   t)f 0(kt) +  tqt] + (+ )qt (7)
where equation (6) is the euler equations and equation (7) describes the evo-
lution of the market price of an installed unit of productive capital.
Following Benhabib et. Al. (2002) attention is restricted to steady states with
non negative ination targets which in turn imply that the nominal rate of
interest is positive. As a result, equation (4) implies that t, the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the liquidity constraint is non zero. It then follows
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from (5) that mt = ct + It. The economic intuition is simple: near a steady
state with positive nominal interest rate holding money entails opportunity
costs, and minimizing the opportunity cost of holding money implies that the
liquidity constraint is binding. It then follows from equations (2),(4)-(5) that
near this steady state u0(ct) = t(1 +Rt).
Consequently, the law of motion for the real value of nancial assets becomes

at = (Rt   t)at + (1   t)f(kt)  (ct + It)(1 +Rt) +  tktqt (8)
and the law of motion for capital is

kt = f(kt)  ct   g   kt (9)
Following much of the recent literature, the baseline model developed here
attaches a very limited role for money. This is demonstrated by equation (8).
Seeing that near a staedy state where nominal interest rate is positive the
equilibrium stock of (real) money equals output, the only explicit role played
by money is to serve as a unit of account. This issue is extensively emphasized
in Woodford (2003) and in Gali (2008).
Note that in this setup productive capital and nancial assets are perfect
substitutes in the private level. Let t  qtt represent the ratio between the
marginal valuations of the two saving devices. Then, t evolves according to:
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
t =  (1   t)f 0(kt)  tt t + t(Rt   t + ) (10)
Thus, equations (6), (9) (10) fully describe the optimal program of a repre-
sentative household as it takes the time path f t; Rt; tg1t=0 as (exogenously)
given. Finally, as we study equilibria close to the steady state the transversality
condition holds.
1.2 General Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the goods market clear
f(kt) = ct + It + g (11)
The rate of investment is set so as to equate the ratio between marginal
valuations of perfect saving substitutes [bonds and capital] to the gross rate of
interest which is the opportunity cost of investing in capital due to the nance
constraint
t = 1 +Rt (12)
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Assets market clears so as to equate the marginal utility of consumption to
the marginal valuation of wealth
u0(ct) = t(1 +Rt) (13)
and the motion equations (6), (8) (10) display the evolution of ft; t; kt; atg1t=0
.
1.2.1 Equilibrium Dynamics
Conjecture that equilibrium in the underlying economy is a mapping of (; ; k).[from
this point on the time notation is omitted for simplicity] In this section we
will characterize the monetary-scal policy that induce a unique equilibrium.
Note that equation (12) and the type of interst rate rule imply that
 = 1 +R() (14)
it then follows that  = (); = k = 0; = 1R0() where subscripts denote
partial derivatives and R0() is the increment in percentage points to the
nominal interest in response to a one percent increase in the rate of ination
relative to the target. Also, equations (12)-(13) imply that u0(c) =  and
therefore c =

u00(c) ; c =

u00(c) ; ck = 0;
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Thus, the dynamics of all the variables in the economy is a mapping in
the (; ; k) space and the evolution of (; ; k) can be described by:

 =
F (; ; k) ;

 = G (; ; k) ;

k = H (; ; k)
where
F (; ; k) [+ () R(())] (15)
G (; ; k) (1  )f 0(k)   +  [R(())  () + ] (16)
H (; ; k) f(k)  c (; )  g   k (17)
and the transversality condition is Limt!1e
 
tZ
0
[R(()) ()]ds
[a (; ; k) + k] =
0
1.2.2 Equilibrium and Local Real Determinacy (LRD)
Following Evans and Guesnerie (2005) I consider only saddle-path stable
solutions as macroeconomically stable.
Denition 1 Equilibrium displays Local-Real-Determinacy (LRD) if there ex-
ists a Saddle-Path stable solution in the (; ; k) space. Otherwise equilibrium
is non-LRD.
Local-Real-Determinacy
Equations (13), (15)(17) imply that in the steady state R =  + ;  =
1 +R;  = u
0(c)
1+R ; f
0(k) = (1+R
)[+(1 )]
1  . Linear approximation to the set
of equations (15)(17) near the steady state is obtained through the system
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26666666666664





k
37777777777775
=
Az }| {26666666666664
0  1 R
0()
R0() 0
 (1 +R)  + (1   ) + (1 +R)R0() 1
R0()  (1   )f 00(k)
  1+R
u00(c)   

u00(c) f
0(k)  
37777777777775
26666666666664
  
   
k   k
37777777777775
(18)
where R0() is the increment in percentage points to the nominal interest
in response to a one percent increase in the rate of ination relative to the
target and   is the rate of income tax that balances the consolidated budget
in the steady state. Specically,   is the solution to 0 = a   Rm + g  
 k [f 0(k)  q]
Let i (i=1,2,3) denote the eigenvalues of matrix A, then,
123 = (19)
  u
0(c)
u00(c)
[(1   )f 00(k) + (f 0(k)  ) u00(c)] R
0()  1
R0()
1 + 2 + 3 =     + f 0(k) + (1 +R)R
0()  1
R0()
(20)
Proposition 2 R0() > 1)Equilibrium is LRD
R0() < 1)Equilibrium is non-LRD
(Proof in Appendix A)
Under Schmitt-Grohe and Uribes (1997) balanced budget constraint, when
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agents become optimistic about the future of the economy and decide to work
harder and invest more, the government is forced to lower the tax rate as
total output rises. The countercyclical tax policy will help fulll agentsini-
tial optimistic expectations, thus leading to indeterminacy of equilibria and
endogenous business cycle uctuations.
This paper o¤ers a slighly di¤ernt approach by considering the a consolidated
balanced budget constraint. Here, the monetary authority controls for the real
interst rate via nancial markets. Suppose that the economy shifts away from
the steady state as a result of a positive shock to expected productivity. In
terms of the model, the stock of capital is now below its steady state level,
and the marginal product of capital is higher than its steady state level. The
nominal interest rate would consequently rise because initially, the real interest
rate has increased. In order to nance the increase in payments following the
rise of the real interest rate, ination tax revenues must increase which in turn
further increases the nominal interest rate.
At the next instant, the stance of the monetary authority is carried out in
the open market. Under the active stance, the monetary authority increases
the rate of bond creation relative to the rate e¤ective prior to the shock, thus
driving the real interest rate above its steady state level. This policy e¤ects
householdsallocation between investment and consumption via an arbitrage
channel.
Note that  measures the marginal utility of consumption distorted by the
nominal interest-rate. Under the active stance the real interest rate is above
its steady state level, and according to the euler equation (13) an active stance
induces a negative growth rate in the marginal utility of consumption. Thus
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implying an increase in consumption. Accordingly, when households become
optimistic about the future of the economy this type of consolidated budget
rule motivates the households to eat away their capital stock, so as to allow
consumption to increase, which further distances the economy from the steady
state. It is this mechanism that prevents optimism that is not anchored in
fundamentals from becoming self fullling.
Under the neutral monetary policy stance, where R0() = 1, the real interest
rate remains constant in and o¤ the steady state and equals :According to
equation (19) this policy introduces a zero eigenvalue and the type of equilib-
rium stability becomes sensitive to the type of scal policy.
Proposition 3 Under a neutral monetary policy stance equilibrium is LRD i¤
scal policy is such that g
c < (c
)'(k)  1 where (c)    u0(c)
cu00(c) ; '(k
) 
 k f 00(k)
f 0(k)
(Proof in Appendix A)
(c) and '(k) measure the intertemporal elasticity of consumption substi-
tution and the elasticity of marginal product of capital near the steady state,
respectively. Consider for example an economy where u(ct) =
c1 t
1  and where
production technology exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to capital
and is of the form f(kt) = Akt . Then, the elasticities of intertemporal substi-
tution and marginal productivity are constant and equal 1

; 1 ; respectively.
Thus, for this economy, a neutral monetary policy stance is stabilizing only if
g
c <
1

(1  )  1
18
2 Equilibria with Externalities
Benhabib et. al. (2000) show that a small divergence between the social and
private returns in multisector growth model is su¢ cient for multiple equilibria.
In the previous section a consolidated-budget rule with monetary dominance
was found to induce LRD in a single sector growth model where income taxes
distort private returns. In view of Benhabib et. al.s (2000) upshot for multi-
sector models it is worthwhile to establish the robustness of the consolidated-
budget rule for single sector models. In this section I will therefore assume
that the production technology exhibits an externality associated with per
capita capital 4 . Production externalities enter the model economy as in Ke-
hoe et al. (1992) and Rebelo and Xie (1999). Suppose that the production
function, f(kp;t; ka;t), exhibits a positive externality where kp; ka are private
capital stock and per capita capital stock in the entire economy, respectively.
f(; ) is strictly increasing in both arguments and concave in kp and continu-
ously di¤erentiable. The representative households optimal program given the
initial stock of private capital kp;0, the per capita stock of capital ka;0; and the
time paths of f ; R; g maximizes the current value hamiltonian H  u(c) +
 [(R  )a+ (1  )f(kp; ka)  (c+ I)(1 +R) + qk]+q [I   k]; hence, the
optimality conditions associated with the households problem are:
4 Guo and Harrison (2008) extend Schmitt-Grohe and Uribes (1997) analysis by the
inclusion of useful government spending. They show that xed government spending
act simply as a scaling constant in either rmsproduction or householdsutility
function. Thus, we should look for external e¤ects in production that do not derive
from goverment purchases.
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=
u0(c)
1 +R
(21)
= 1 +R (22)

= [+   R] (23)

= (1  )f1(k; k)   +  [R   + ] (24)

k= f(k; k)  c  g   k (25)

a= (R  )a+ (1  )f(k; k)  (c+ I)(1 +R) + qk (26)
and the transversality condition is Limt!1e
 
tZ
0
[R(s) (s)]ds
[a+ k] = 0
Where subscripts denote partial derivatives,   q

denotes the ratio between
the co-state variables, and the condition for a symmetric equilibrium, kp =
ka = k, is substituted into equation (24) only after the derivative of H with
respect to kp is taken.
2.1 The Government
The real value of the governments liabilities evolves according to

a = [R  ] a 
Rm + [g    [f(k; k)  qk]] whereas the interest rate feedback rule is of the
form R = R [(; ; k)] :The government, unlike the households sector, inter-
nalizes the externality.
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2.2 General Equilibrium
Consumption per capita and the rate of ination are set in general equilibrium.
Also, the scal and monetary policy are set so as to obtain a solution to the
central planners problem . Hence, these magnitudes are derived as if the
central planner internalizes the externality. In equilibrium, the goods market
clear
f(k; k) = c+ I + g (27)
Also, in equilibrium the rate of investment is set so as to equate the ratio
between marginal valuations of nancial wealth and productive capital to the
opportunity cost which is the gross rate of interest, and assets market clears
so as to equate the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal valuation
of nancial wealth. Thus, equation (12) - (13) hold and the motion equations
(23) (26) display the evolution of f; ; k; ag1t=0 .
2.2.1 Equilibrium Dynamics
Conjecture that equilibrium in the underlying economy is a mapping of (; ; k).
In this section we will characterize the monetary-scal policy that induce an
LRD equilibrium. Note that equation (23) and the type of interst rate rule
imply that
 = 1 +R() (28)
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it then follows that  = (); = k = 0;  = 1R0() where subscripts
denote partial derivatives and R0() is the increment in percentage points of
the nominal interest to a one percent increase in the rate of ination relative
to the target. Also, equations (21)-(22) imply that u0(c) =  and therefore
c =

u00(c) ; c =

u00(c) ; ck = 0;
The dynamics of all the variables in the economy can thus be described by
(; ; k) and the evolution of (; ; k) can be described by:

 = F (; ; k) ;

 =
G (; ; k) ;

k = H (; ; k)
where
F (; ; k) [+ () R(())] (29)
G (; ; k) (1  )f1(k; k)   +  [R(())  () + ] (30)
H (; ; k) f(k; k)  c (; )  g   k (31)
and the transversality condition is Limt!1e
 
tZ
0
[R(()) ()]ds
[a (; ; k) + k] =
0
2.2.2 Equilibrium and Local Real Determinacy (LRD)
Local-Real-Determinacy
Equations (13), (29)(31) imply that in the steady state R =  + ;  =
1 +R;  = u
0(c)
1+R ; f1(k
; k) = (1+R
)[+(1 )]
1  . Linear approximation to the
set of equations (29)(31) near the steady state is obtained through the system
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26666666666664





k
37777777777775
=B 
26666666666664
  
   
k   k
37777777777775
where B 26666666666664
0  1 R
0()
R0() 0
 (1 +R)  + (1   ) + (1 +R)R0() 1
R0()  (1   ) [f11(k; k) + f12(k; k)]
  1+R
u00(c)   

u00(c) f1(k
; k) + f2(k; k)  
37777777777775
Let i (i=1,2,3) denote the eigenvalues of matrix B, thus,
123 =
  u
0(c)
u00(c)
[(1   ) [f11(k; k) + f12(k; k)] + (f1(k; k) + f2(k; k)  ) u00(c)] R
0()  1
R0()
1 + 2 + 3 =
f1(k
; k) + f2(k; k) +     + (1 +R)R
0()  1
R0()
Proposition 4 In an economy where marginal product of capital is non-
increasing in the social level, an active monetary policy stance within a consolidated-
budget rule induces an LRD equilibrium.
(Proof in Appendix A)
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3 Conclusion
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe ( 1997) show that the exact formulation of a balanced-
budget scal policy plays an important role in a¤ecting the determination of
real allocation in an otherwise standard one-sector real business cycle model
with wasteful government purchases. Specically, they show that when a bal-
anced budget rule consists of xed goverment spending and proportional tax-
ation on total income, the economy may exhibit an indeterminate steady state
and a continuum of stationary sunspot equilibria. Furthermore, Guo and Har-
rison (2008) show that the indeterminacy result obtained in Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe ( 1997) remain unchanged by the inclusion of useful government
spending, regardless of wheter it has an external e¤ect on rmsproduction or
on householdsutility. In this paper I maintain the assumption of exogenous
government spending within a balanced-budget requirement. However, I aug-
ment the balanced-budget requirement so as to incorporate the interaction
between sacl policy and monetary policy within the requirement that the
instantaneous budget of the consolidated government is balanced.
Following Leeper (1991) I focus on rules that exhibit monetary dominance.
Under this set of rules it is assumed that the monetary authority implements
its policy stance regardless of the scal authority. The monetary authority
trade bonds for money in the open market so as to impose over the economy a
desired nominal interest rate. By doing so, the monetary authority a¤ects the
size of primary decit. Only then, given the size of government purchases and
the size of interest payments over outstanding debt, the scal authority sets
the rate of income tax so as to balance the consolidated budget. Results show
that a consolidated budget rule that exhibits monetary dominance whereby
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the monetary authority sets the nominal interest so as to increase the real
rate of interest during booms induces a determinate equilibrium. This result
is consistent with the celebrated Taylor principle and with the results obtained
in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe ( 2007). Unlike in previous literature, results show
that with high degrees of intertemporal substitution, a small government [in
the sense of g
c ] can stabilize the economy by assuming a neutral stance such
that induces a constant real interest rate in and o¤ the steady state.
Finally, it should be noted that it is not straightforward to conclude that the
policies prescribed in this paper can also eliminate indeterminacies in multi
sector models. I think that this issue deserves further research.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider an active stance, i.e. R0() > 1: Note the right hand side of equation
??. When monetary policy is active the product of eigenvalues is negative,
which imply that either there is one negative eigenvalue and two eigenvalues
with positive real parts, or all three eigenvalues are negative. Note equation ??.
Under an active stance the sum of eigenvalues is positive which rules out the
possibility that all the eigenvalues are negative. With one negative eigenvalue
and one predetermined state variable the equilibrium is saddle-path stable.
Consider the passive stance: The passive policy implies the product of eigen-
values is positive which implies that either two eigenvalue are stable and one
is unstable, or that all three eigenvalues are unstable. And in this case equi-
librium is non-LRD. QED.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a neutral monetary policy stance, i.e. R0() = 1: under this policy
stance the real interest rate is constant in and o¤ the steady state and equals
:Consequently, as we can see from the euler equation 29, consumption is
constant and the time path of all the variables in the economy is spanned by
f; kg. Accordingly, the evolution of f; ; kg is

 = 0

 =  (1  )f 0(k)   +  [+ ]

k = f(k)  c (; )  g   k
equilibrium dynamics also implies that k = 0; = 1 and c = u00(c) ; ck = 0;
Linear approximation near the steady state is obtained through
26666664



k
37777775=
Az }| {26666664
+ (1   )  (1   )f 00(k)
  
u00(c) f
0(k)  
37777775
26666664
   
k   k
37777775
and accordingly, equilibrium is LRD i¤ the product of eigenvalues, denotes as
12; is negative.
Note that 12 = [+ (1   )] [f 0(k)  ]  [(1   )f 00(k)] u00(c)
and in the steady state (1 
)f 0(k)
(1+R) = +  (1   ) ;  = 1 +R;  = u
0(c)
1+R ;
Thus
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12 =
(1 )f 0(k)
(1+R) [f
0(k)  ] [(1   )f 00(k)] u0(c)
u00(c)(1+R) =
(1 )f 0(k)
(1+R)
h
[f 0(k)  ]  f 00(k)
f 0(k)
u0(c)
u00(c)
i
= (1 
)f 0(k)
(1+R)
c
k
h
k
c [f
0(k)  ]  kf 00(k)
f 0(k)
u0(c)
u00(c)c
i
nally k

c [f
0(k)  ] = 1
c [f(k
)  I] = 1
c [c
 + g] = 1+ g
c and hence 12 <
0() 1 + g
c   k
f 00(k)
f 0(k)
u0(c)
u00(c)c < 0
QED.
Proof of Proposition 3
Marginal product of capital at the social level is non increasing i¤ f11(k; k)+
f12(k
; k)  0:Consider an active stance, i.e. R0() > 1. When monetary pol-
icy is active the product of eigenvalues is negative, which imply that either
there is one negative eigenvalue and two eigenvalues with positive real parts,
or all three eigenvalues are negative. Under an active stance the sum of eigen-
values is positive which rules out the possibility that all the eigenvalues are
negative. Thus, equilibrium is saddle-path stable.
Consider the passive stance: The passive policy implies the product of eigen-
values is positive which implies that either two eigenvalue are stable and one
is unstable, or that all three eigenvalues are unstable. And in this case equi-
librium is non-LRD. QED.
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